by
LK
On September 30th the voters of Ukraine went to the polls to elect representatives to the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council of Ukraine). This was just over a year since the previous election which was held on March 26, 2006. Compared to the international media circus surrounding the Ukrainian presidential election fiasco of 2004 there was scant global press coverage this time around. Several interesting features of the election can be noted. Firstly, there is a trend to a further polarisation between the pro-West/EU forces and pro-Russia groups. The Party of Regions (34.37% of the vote) as the major pro-Russian group has been the main beneficiary of popular resentment at the deindustrialisation of East Ukraine, discrimination against Russian speakers, and internal meddling by European Union and NATO officials. This is not to say that the leadership of the Party of Regions is necessarily sincere in their opposition to these developments, but only that they have sought a public profile as opponents of the “West”. On the pro-West side the Bloc of Yulia Timoshenko (30.71% of the vote)has clearly gained the lead over their sometime ally, sometime adversary Our Ukraine(14.15% of the vote) led by poison survivor and President of Ukraine Viktor Yuschchenko. These two parties are quite often referred to as Ukrainian Nationalist, but this is not quite true. The leadership of these parties is composed of pro-European Union globalists and their propaganda is of a “look to the west” variety. A case in point is candidate no.14 on the list of the Yulia Timoshenko Bloc, Andriy Shkil. He was formerly leader of the militantly nationalist and anti-American/EU/NATO group UNA-UNSO, yet according to Ukrainian Electoral Commission documents, he now is President of the Foundation of Ukrainian-European Initiative.
This brings us to the next point, the almost total absence of Ukrainian Nationalism, despite frequent references to the bourgeoning nazi and fascist movement. The only group carrying the banner of radical Ukrainian Nationalism was the All-Ukrainian Movement Svoboda (Freedom) led by Oleh Tiahnybok, formerly fuehrer of the Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine. This outfit managed a mere 0.76% which, although being a slight improvement on 2006, can hardly be called a threat to budding Ukrainian democracy. One would almost wish it were more of a threat!
Lastly, the varied fortunes of the socialist movements will be dealt with. The Socialist Party of Ukraine seems to have finally reached the end of the electoral road. Led by political survivor Oleksandr Moroz, the tortured political and ideological path of the party, which has been represented in parliament since 1990, has left the party with no seats in the Rada. Their policy of allying themselves first with one party, then with another, has left them politically discredited. Hopefully this is the last we’ll hear of this outfit.
More disappointing was the showing of Natalya Vitrenko’s Progressive Socialist Party. Despite being the most vocal proponent of a “Slavonic” orientation in Ukrainian politics and the most vigorous opponent of the rush to the West, her results declined in relation to 2006, giving her party a mere 1.32% of the vote. Her party did however have certain good results in particular regions which will be discussed later. A more regionally oriented election system as used in most European countries would have given Vitrenko’s party parliamentary representation.
The most encouraging sign in the election was the small revival in fortunes of the Communist Party of Ukraine led by Petro Symonenko. The Communists made a gain of almost 300,000 votes giving them 5.39% of the total and an increase in the Rada of six seats. It is worthwhile looking at the particular areas in which both the Communist Party and the Progressive Socialist Party scored their best results. Both parties had their best results in the Sevastopol region, the communists with 10.3% and the Progressive Socialists with 6.64%. This is the result partly of the vigorous anti-NATO protests coordinated by these two parties. These parties also did reasonably well in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which has been the site of similar protests.
One can conclude that the
main
motivating force among the populace is their sense of identity and
belonging. Despite the conversion of
Ukraine into an
economic and demographic wasteland, economic issues are clearly
subordinated to
more emotive issues such as pro/anti-NATO/EU/ Russia/USA. The
geopolitical
orientation of a party determines its economic outlook. The
pro-EU parties of Timoshenko and
Yushchenko are firmly committed to globalism and economic liberalism. The Slavophile oriented parties, such as the
Communist Party of Ukraine and the Progressive Socialist Party, tend
toward
socialist/collectivist forms of economic organisation. Even
the Party of Regions, whose background as
a party of oligarchs and local political powerbrokers would incline
them towards
economic liberalism, has adopted a form of leftist populism as a result
of
their pro-Russian policies. The one
bright spot could be that as people note the continuing compromises of
the
Party of Regions and its empty sloganeering, they will turn
increasingly to the
Communists and the Progressive Socialists.
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