At the IV plenum of the Central Committee of the CPRF, held on February 14, 1996, comrade U.P. Belov, secretary of the Leningrad joint committee, member of the Central Committee of the CPRF, proposed that a resolution be adopted at the V plenum, slated for April, regarding organizational and political unity of the party.
Fully endorsing this idea, we find it inevitable to confirm the agenda of the plenum as follows:
Alarming also is the weakening of the activities of the CPRF in connection with the assembling of healthy Marxist-Leninist, proletarian-patriotic forces, and in the solidifying the temporarily fragmented communist movement.
According to the recent analysis, all these negative occurrences became possible only because of the factional formation in the main party apparatus of a conciliatory right-wing faction which monopolized all spheres of influence over the local party organizations. Aiming at the neutralization of the left, Leninist wing of the party and at its complete destruction, the faction has embarked on a course of splitting tactics. It has succeeded in the dismemberment of the Kaliningrad regional party organizations and has now, on February 28, undertaken the similar task at the party conference in Kemerovo.
In this regard we find it imperative to state that should this very important situation not be rectified by the Central Committee, the communists will have the right to implement the line of action of its principled platform (see paragraph 5 of the party rules) for the popularization of fundamental conditions of the enclosed draft, for the defence of the ideological and organizational values of the party, and for the realization of the decisions of the IV congress.
The five-year results of the activities of the party of the Russian Federation (1993-1998) once again confirm the correctness of the Leninist conclusions that "the unity and solidarity of its ranks, the guaranteeing of trust amongst the members, of the party and the genuinely amicable functions, and in the complete fulfillment of the united will of the vanguard of the proletariat is especially necessary at the present time when a number of conditions are beginning to increase the wavering in the midst of the petty-bourgeois populace of the country." (CPSU resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee. Ch. I. M., 1954, pp 527-528.)
It is understandable that the CPRF is compelled to work in conditions that are qualitatively different from those during the civil war and during the time of the turn towards a new economic policy, when the resolution of the X congress was accepted regarding the "Unity of the Party", (March, 1921). Until now the activities of the CPRF are burdened with the consequences of a moral and political crisis and with the defeat suffered in the early 1990s. Today, a complete restoration of capitalist attitudes has taken place. Communists became the opposition to the ruling hierarchy even though they have a considerable representation in the law enforcement agencies. Unfortunately. in the present conditions the party does not possess the system needed to prepare the necessary personnel to work with the masses. Commensurate with its political weight they do not seem to have the ideally-moral influences in the country.
1. Immediately following the constitutional RF trial regarding the "affairs" of the CPSU (May-November, 1992) and following the II (rehabilitative) congress of the Russian communist party (February, 1993), there arose before the communists the question of again determining its strategic line and day-to-day tactics. The CPRF had unanimously endorsed the slogan of the Central Committee which called for a struggle against political extremism - both right and left - a slogan which completely justified itself in the struggle against the anti-Soviet, September-October (1993) revolution and allowed to bring the party out from under a crush.
Subsequent events, however, showed that the confirmed leadership of the Central Committee, namely, G. Zhuganov, Y. Belov, A. Lukyanov and others, not only contravenes the accepted measures, and political flexibility but also conscientiously follows the course of isolation from the basic fundamentals of the communist ideology. It is disseminating unsubstantiated political extremism in successive order in a Marxist-Leninist direction (orthodoxy) and a preparedness to use radical methods in case of necessity (revolutionary public sentiments), and is doing everything possible to isolate their representatives from the masses.
The immediate harm that was inflicted on the activities and prestige of the CPRF was caused by the erroneous concept that "revolutionary limits" in Russia had been reached. Its basic harm was in the pronouncement that the responsibility for the disintegration of the country as well as for the creation of a revolutionary situation and, in fact, the unleashing of civil war is brought about by capital and by its servants -- the bourgeois-criminal elements from the communist jurisdiction who, all in all, are predicting the inevitability of a revolutionary flare-up while, at the same time, are conducting their own political activities. In the final analysis it, morally, freed the hands of the reactionaries-putchists to not only give birth to confusion amongst the party members, it also created a basis for some conscientious communists to conclude that CPRF is a bourgeois parliamentary party.
Until now the Central Committee did not distance itself from the disgraceful theory of "limit" which today is judged by the communist movement the world over. Authoritative and clear definitions are necessary to explain that orthodoxy is a consequence of the communist ideology, that allegiance to prevailing dialectics of development has nothing in common with dogmatism and that if communists are determined to achieve victory over capitalism it is radicalism, fundamentalism and realism that is their inalienable predisposition. In party circles it is necessary to expose the difference between evolution and revolution. Dissent among communists should not be encouraged on the questions of the possibilities of a peaceful, bloodless socialist revolution, its incoherence with forceful terrorist methods until such time as when the reactionary elements introduce them. The party should possess a clear understanding of not only its own history but also of the results of the scientific analysis of contemporary times.
2. The past five years have clearly demonstrated that the group of so-called leaders are shaping the CPRF into a parliamentary party, adapting it to the present conditions in Russia with a view to grafting it as the left-wing of a two-party bourgeois system. This became irrefutably clear after the IV party congress (April 1997).
In exchange for the unfulfilled promises the leaders of the CPRF -- rather than show support for the proclamation of the congress for an attack in autumn by the workers in a political confrontation -- they secured a relative political calmness and refused action on any of the formerly accepted responsibilities. The Duma faction of the party had retreated from such key questions as the resignation of the government from participation in the apportioning of produce, from the state budget and from a review of privatization.
The leadership of the Central Committee is, in essence, ignoring the rich experiences of the RSDLP in the I-IV Dumas of the government (1906-1914), of the Leninist principle of submission of Duma's practices to the non-Duma struggles and at the same time concentrating its basic activities inside the Duma. The inclusion in the Duma of top party leaders and also half of the leaders of regional party organizations - while parliament is financed by the president's budget, - converts the nucleus of "responsible and irreconcilable opposition" of the members to the Yeltsin state apparatus, unites the party cadres, and disfigures the internal viewpoints. This is precisely the explanation of how the distribution, again in contravention of the arrangements of the IV congress, of illusion. regarding the "assumption of power" is a deterrent to a political self-determination and to the distancing itself from the "rank and file."
Regardless of the fact that, in the last five years the populace is forced into poverty by the centre and is becoming more leftist, it has not gained any sound positions in the trade unions or in the patriotic military circles, and is expressing indifference to the strike or protest movements resembling the Soviets in the collectives as well as locally. In contrast to the routine line of the top, all this demonstrates to the party activists the importance of the development of an alternative creative line of the toiling masses in conjunction with a reasonable combination with the basic struggles within the walls of the parliament of the healthy democratization of the course of the entire party.
3. All these disorders within the party ranks did not have to happen had the Central Committee been more fastidious and competent in its ideological world outlook, in its dealing with ideological questions, and also had shown a firm effective control of its leadership.
The Central Committee of the party recognizes that a bourgeois bureaucratic counter-revolution had taken place in the country during 1991-1993, but displaying inconsistency, was in no hurry to recognize the bourgeois-class character of today's state of Russia. Proceeding from the obvious facts of the destruction of the Soviet Union, of the territorial integrity and independence of Russia, the leadership of the Central Committee is correct in stressing the inevitability of the mobilization of the countrymen for a war of liberation. However, at the same time the official theoreticians of the CPRF are developing an "ideology of state patriotism" which proclaims a utopian unity of the "white" and "red" ideologies, and ignores the simple fact that patriotism with regard to the bourgeois state could only be bourgeois; it also ignores the indisputable truth of Marxism that genuine national emancipation is possible only through emancipation from the capitalist oppression.
As far back as two years ago the party membership had raised an alarm regarding the excessive influence that A. Podberezkin has on the ideological atmosphere in the leadership of the CPRF. A. Podberezkin is a leader of the Russian-American University in the Movement of "Spiritual Legacy." But thanks to the principled positions of genuine communists the hopes of this "prophet" anti-communist did not materialize. He is also the author of the program for "Our House -- Russia", which would pattern the program of the CPRF along his lines and thus become a substitute for the ideological basis of the party.
But the situation in the area of ideology remains serious. The majority of communists understands the seriousness of the displacement of the genuine revolutionary-patriotic teachings with a Russian version of national liberalism, Christian democracy, pragmatism and opportunism. However, there also are other influences that demand intensification of vigilance. And thus, the lengthy propaganda of a multi-phased economy, having no definite scientific definition of its social structure or a vector of its development, the support for market myths, all this fully camouflages the course towards Russia's revival and socialism. Attention here is drawn towards the drafting of a pre-election platform of the CPRF. The participants in this are not new people; they are the same "specialists" who, at the beginning of "perestroika" have greatly "distinguished" themselves in the demise of the Soviet planned economic system. They are T. Koryagin, N. Ryzkov, Y. Maklukov and L. Abalkin. Not on board are the communist-economists, business executives and scientists who are capable of providing development of original programs, of providing realistic and genuine recommendations for leading the country out of a crisis.
Well-founded conclusions are drawn that there exists a creeping liquidationist tendency, and about the desire of the clan of new politicians to graft Russia with the bourgeois two-party system of government patterned after either the British or American systems, and also to convert the CPRF into its social-democratic appendage. In the event of failure in this endeavour, to factually exclude the powerful Communist party as a social political force of society. The Central Committee is cognisant of the consequences that this may result in and is doing everything possible to prevent it.
4. The Central Committee states that a shameful new practice is being carried out by the leadership of the party in which the opinions of a narrow group in their ranks is being proclaimed as the opinions of the party as a whole. Especially inadmissible are the pronouncements by G. Zhuganov who (according to himself) is, in the eyes of the whole nation as well as of the international society, the spokesman for the whole party. In his books and articles G.A. Zhuganov is developing an anti-Marxist line which is contradictory to the collectively developed line of the Central Committee. A leader of such caliber does not possess the right to a personal opinion that differs from collectively confirmed procedures of the leading party. He either has to leave his post and then freely expound his theories or he has to be able to convince the party of the correctness of his views. As a cover-up for his anti-party activity comrade Zhuganov states he is duty-bound to speak not only in the name of the CPRF but also of the NPRF and of the Duma faction, which, factually, does not reduce the party to the level of an appendage of the movement and of a faction.
5. Such conduct reflects negatively on the qualitative and collective composition of the party. Many genuine communists, dissatisfied with the anti-anticommunist line of the party leadership, are leaving the party. Notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the leaders of principle in the regions (such as in the Kemerovsk region), the number of party organizations is diminishing. In organizations where the leadership does not conform to the principled line of the Central Committee and is following the line of the faction, the defection is even more pronounced, but thanks to the confusion in signing up and to the lowering of the standards required of the new members, the number of members remains constant, and at times increases. However, new members come at the expense of non-communist, petty-bourgeois elements who, thanks to the electoral victory in the Duma, began to feel a nearness to the state pie. Genuine party members are leaving the party. This may be nice for the parliamentary party who are hoping to graft the party to a bourgeois two-party system, but to the communist this could be equivalent to death.
6. The differences in the CPRF are constantly nourished today by the multi-party system of the Russian communist movement and by the lack of desire of the party leadership to put an end to this situation by using flexible and definite actions of solidarity.
The Executive Committee considers it imperative, defining its own ideally-political course, to appeal to other communist parties to rally to a call of action for co-operation of communists and progressive-patriotic forces to an agreed-to agreement of aims and principles to immediately begin negotiations towards a gradual organizational unity of all relative Marxist-Leninist organizations and groups.
For the clarification of the different points of view, their comparisons and the development of each position it is proposed to hold joint sessions, a regularly active Communist forum which would function on all levels and would be able to operate as a Soviet of all interested parties and groups.
7. There is no concordance of materials in the so-called party press with the standards of communist principles. It appears that some influential circles are masterminding the lack of correlation.
Five years ago the Central Committee of the CPRF was to have had an administrative body in the central party organ which would allow responsible discussions on party strategy, provide considered evaluations which would orientate the communists on the main questions of internal and external policies. Politico-technical discussions are of great value in the party organizations and in the press, but the subjects in question should not be those which were convincingly solved by Marxist-Leninist science and thus create doubt about the fundamental conditions of class approach. Unity of will and actions also demand certain principled pre-conditions. These pre-conditions are made during comradely arguments, but from the moment of decision when social opinions become crystal clear it becomes necessary to show action and not discord.
Obstacles in connection with the starting of a paper are usually the shortage of funds. But the presence of annoying competition, for example such five papers as "Pravda" (A. Ilyin), "Pravda Five" (V. Ryapin), "Pravda" (V. Linnik), "Russian Pravda" and "Pravda of Moscow" indicates that the problem here is not in the shortage of funds but in the display of anarchy and in the absence of able party leadership, or more accurately, in the inability (or possible criminal undesirability) to organize a party press. The funds that are spent on printing these publications would have been more than enough to produce one Leninist "Pravda" of world stature that would be able to unite around itself the best of journalistic and theoretical forces, that would fulfil the role of a collective agitator, propagandist and organizer of the masses and solidify the party ranks from within.
Of great urgency today is the question of the party participation in television programming, but it should not be viewed as an "appearance of the chief" but as realization of the freedom of speech for the entire party.
8. All in all, the state of party unity is adversely affected by the bureaucratic inertness of the leadership of the Central Committee who is definitely positioned itself in a rightist direction. Factually, the discussion here is about the existing violation of the CPRF Rules, about the faction which systematically dissipates the leftist attitude of mind of party members, and which holds a powerful monopoly, objectively constricting the possibilities and diminishes the authority of the CPRF.
There are opinions in the party that it is impossible to liven the general climate in its organizations and to eliminate the splitting behaviours without new cadres, without a youthful composition of the membership.
In this connection the plenum considers the following inevitable:
* partition the office of the Chairman of the Central Committee, of the Director of the Duma faction and of the Chairman of the NPSR and to recommend responsible and authoritative people from the three;
* revive the standards of behaviour of the Central Committee over the Duma faction and control over it; review the practice of vote on individual items by communist representatives and to suggest that they function completely within the bounds of the collective demands of the Central Committee;
* take measures to found a CPRF political school, having in mind a) a primary Marxist-Leninist organizational-political preparation of party youth; b) additional training for party activists of various profiles; c) resumption of the preparation of party politicians for higher qualifications through post-graduate studentship;
* to elevate the functions and the significance of the CCC with considerations to propose to the regular V congress of the CPRF a resolution regarding an item in the Position of the Commission which would give it the right to ideologically examine party documents and publications.
The plenum is warning that the introduction of ideal turmoil, of fostering contradictions between groups and individuals within the party is one of the most undermining actions of a class adversary, of liquidationists, opportunist, highly chauvinist and nationalist elements that had penetrated into the ranks of the CPRF. The plenum is calling on all communists rally together in the continuation of the developing Leninism on the basis of national pride of the great Russians socialist patriotism and the proletarian solidarity of the workers.
Draft presented to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPRF, March 10, 1998
Translated from the Russian by Alex Sturgeoff
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