

## In the crucible of tests

*Dedicated to Predrag Chadomirovich Milichevich,  
a glorious son of Yugoslavia, a convinced communist, a staunch fighter for  
socialism.*

*V.N. Chechentsev, 10.02.2017.*

*Nobody is forgotten, nothing is forgotten*

Nowadays, when the communist movement in the republics of the former SFRY is experiencing a severe crisis (as, indeed, in other Eastern European countries), it is not superfluous to recall the history of the formation of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), the history of its outstanding victories and serious defeats, count, to the loss of the country's socialist gains and the collapse of independent states.

It should immediately be said that the history of the CPY, and since November 1952 of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia (UCY), contains a number of points that make it difficult to understand its integrity. Among these moments: 1) the harsh conditions of the Communist Party, almost from the time it was formed in 1919, was in an illegal position, so there are very few available party documents on its work; 2) the not always expedient intervention of the leadership of the Comintern in the affairs of the CPY as its section; 3) unreasonable repression of a number of leading figures of the CPY who worked abroad; 4) the tragic consequences for thousands of Communists of the conflict between the USSR and Yugoslavia; 5) skillful use by the imperialist countries of the revisionist course of the UCY.

The task of Marxist historians to see all these complexities in a relationship is not to allow them to weigh on the assessments of the long path of the best sons and daughters of the working people of Yugoslavia. As noted in the Program of the New Communist Party of Yugoslavia, "You can not go forward successfully unless you confirm and inherit all the tremendous achievements of the previous world achieved in the building of socialism, and if all serious errors and mistakes, all wanderings, inconsistencies and delusions are not discarded" [1].

In the present work, the history of the CPY from the moment of its formation to the 5th conference in October 1940 on the eve of the outbreak of the people's liberation war of 1941-1945 is considered.

The CPY is the heir to the revolutionary tradition laid in the second half of the nineteenth century and associated with the name all wanderings of such figures as Zhivoyin Zhujovich (Zhuyevich), Svetozar Markovich, Radovan Dragovich, and others. A new scope for the revolutionary workers' movement on the territory that later formed a single state - Yugoslavia, was given by the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Many natives of the Yugoslav lands, primarily from the composition of prisoners of war (and there were about 200,000 prisoners in Russia) took part in the revolution and civil war in Russia. Some of them distinguished themselves in battles for the Soviet power. Let's name only the legendary hero of the civil war Oleko Dundich, the general of the Red Army Danilo Srdich, the deputy of the Petrograd Soviet Vukashin Markovich. More than 30,000 Yugoslav volunteers fought in the ranks of the Red Army during the civil war and foreign intervention.

It should be noted that the October Revolution found the young Croat Josip Broz Tito in Russia, who was captured in 1915. In his memoirs, Tito admits that he was not an active supporter of Soviet power: "I was often told that in Russia I took a significant part in the October Revolution and civil war. Unfortunately,

this is not entirely true. I served for several months in the Red International Guard, but I never fought at the front, because I was still weak after injury and illness ... " [2].

Already in May 1918 in Moscow, with the participation of Vukashin Markovich, the Yugoslav communist group was formed. Then on November 5, 1918, it held a conference that decided to establish a Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in the territory of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.

The return of thousands of Yugoslav prisoners of war from Soviet Russia, inspired by the example of the proletarian revolution, played a huge role in the development of the struggle of the Yugoslav workers in the collapse of Austria-Hungary. The aggravation of the political and economic crisis in the country contributed to the radicalization of the Social-Democratic and other workers' organizations. On April 20, 1919, the Bolshevik members of these organizations founded the Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia (Communists) - the SWPY (c). The political secretaries of the created party were Filip Filipovich and Zhivko Topalovich, and Vladimir Chopich was elected as the organizational secretary. The party leadership also included Sima Markovich, Vukashin Markovich, Trisha Katslerovich. In the same year of 1918, the SWPY (c) became a section of the Third Communist International.

In June 1920, Vukovar hosted the 2nd Congress of the SWPY (c), at which it was decided to rename the party to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). Leaders of the party included Pavel Pavlovich and Yakov Lastrich (chairmen of the party's Central Committee), Filip Filipovich, Sima Markovich (political secretaries) and Vladimir Chopich (organizational secretary).

By that time the CPY had managed to gain a great influence among the masses of working people thanks to its support in the creation of a single Yugoslav state of Yugoslavia (proclaimed December 4, 1918 under the name of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), demonstrations and assistance in strikes.

The southern Slav lands, devastated by the war, entered a period of severe economic crisis. Huge inflation, poverty affected the overwhelming majority of the population. The working class strengthened the resistance of the power of capital. In 1920 there were about 600 strikes, in which more than 200,000 people took part. In the general strike of railway men in April 1920, up to 60,000 workers and employees participated. The strike, which lasted more than 2 weeks and paralyzed the economic life in the country, was suppressed with the use of all means, including the introduction of martial law and the use of soldiers. But this major defeat did not lead then to the decline of the workers 'and peasants' movement. During the 1920s, elections to the municipal and rural communal administrations in Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia took place on the territory of Yugoslavia. The CPY achieved significant success in Belgrade, where it received the majority of votes in Kragujevac, Valjevo, Shabatz, Leskovac and other cities, in the villages of Macedonia. The results of the elections in Belgrade were canceled.

Participating in elections to the Constituent Assembly of the country at the end of November 1920, the CPY collected almost 200,000 votes and took the third place among political parties by the number of deputies (58 seats) [3]. Frightened by the growing influence of the Communists, the regime of the Karageorgievich dynasty, represented by the government Milenko Vesnic, issued Decree Obznana (notice) on December 30, 1920, temporarily prohibiting the propaganda activities of the Communist Party, trade union and other organizations that were under the influence of the Communist Party.

In an atmosphere of increased terror and repression, the Constituent Assembly on June 28, 1921 adopted a constitution proclaiming the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian state a monarchy with a unicameral assembly (parliament) and considerable power of the king. The unsuccessful attempt on the future King Alexander Karagorievich July 29, 1921 became for the authorities (the government of Nikola Pashich) a pretext for the adoption by the Assembly on August 2, 1921 of the law "On the Protection of the State." The CPY was declared dissolved, for membership in it, katorga was provided for up to 20 years. The mandates of 58 communist deputies were annulled, and they were brought to court.

In connection with the attempt, the authorities arrested members of the CPY Executive Committee Filip Filipovich, Vladimir Chopich, Nikola Kovacevic, and after the adoption of the law "On the Protection of the State", other members of the leadership of the Communist Party were also arrested. It was a tough time for the party, it turned out to be unprepared for the transition to an illegal position. Many organizations of the party broke up, and the remaining ones were in decline.

As a result of terror, severe persecution, the departure of unstable elements from the party, the number of members of the CPY decreased from more than 60,000 to several thousand, and the reduction in the number of Komsomol members was even higher. As stated in the resolution of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern: "along with the objective reasons that lie in the general situation of the country, the destruction of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia should to a large extent be attributed to its internal weakness: its external growth did not correspond to the development or cohesion of the organization or the level of the communist consciousness of party members " [17].

But the regime failed to completely throttle the workers' and communist movement. The best part of the CPY in the hardest conditions of the underground continued the revolutionary struggle. I give the floor to Tito: "We have never had the opportunity to be a legal party. For more than 20 years, our Party has been in hiding. In such conditions it was hard to work, and this required us to make great sacrifices. There were few such parties. And only because we were well-versed in conditions such as those that existed in Yugoslavia, our party cells have many cadres. Many of them fell in the struggle against the class enemy and during the liberation war " [4]

After the ban of the CPY in 1921, the party was headed by an alternative leadership led by Costa Novakovich, Tricia Katslerovich and Moshe Piade. In contrast to the alternative leadership, part of the Communists in September 1921 formed the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in exile, headed by Sima Markovich. Separation of these groups gave rise to factionalism in the ranks of the party. In its governing bodies, there was a sharp polemic around issues of tactics and organizational construction. There are two main lines.

The group "levitsa" identified itself with consistent revolutionary tactics, and acted with all determination for abandoning the party's social democratic legacy. The group of "hand" did not share the leftism of the group "levitsa". The left grouping of the "leftist" included Moshe Pyade, Kosta Novakovich, Juro Tsviich, Kamilo Horvathin, Raiko Jovanovic, and others. The right grouping "right hand" was headed by Sima Markovich, Lazar Stefanovich, Milivoje Kalievich, Lyuba Radovanovich. Both groups united at the first conference in Vienna July 3-17, 1922. Milan Gorkic, future general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, as a delegate of the party organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, took part in its work. It was then he was 18 years old.

Despite formal support for the decisions of the Third and Fourth Congresses of the Comintern, the factional struggle continued in the leading party bodies, which complicated the work of Party organizations on the ground. The secretary of the Central Committee of the CPY, Simu Markovic, who was elected from the Second Conference in Vienna on May 9-12, 1923, was replaced by Secretary of the Central Committee Trisha Katslerovich, who remained the head until May 1926. Tactical and organizational guidelines of the "levitian" were approved at the 3rd Conference of the Communist Party in January 1924. The decisions of the conference were supported by the leadership of the Comintern. The results of the 3rd conference were approved with approval by local party organizations of the country, which was reflected in the growth of party ranks. The number of party members increased from about one thousand in January 1924 to 2,300 in January 1925.

The 3rd Congress of the CPY, held in Vienna in May 1926, confirmed the decision of the 3rd Conference. The Congress elected Sima Markovic as political secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, declaring that he had renounced his previous disagreements with the "leftist". Radomir Vujovic was elected Organizing Secretary of the Central Committee. But even after the congress, the factional struggle continued. In April 1928, the ECCI convened in Moscow a meeting with the most active part of the CPY for a detailed analysis of the situation in the party. Its task was to take measures to

eliminate the factional struggle, taking into account the decisions of the November-December plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 1927 and the requirements of the 8th Zagreb regional conference, which was held in February 1928. Milan Gorkich took an active part in the work of the meeting and in the development of his decisions. The Yugoslav Communists had a great deal of help from the Open Letter of the Comintern to the members of the Communist Party, which condemned factionalism in the

party. As a result of the meeting, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was dissolved and replaced by a temporary leadership headed by Juro Djakovic.

At the VI Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow from July 17 to September 1, 1928, Gorkovich was elected a member of the international control committee of the Comintern. The large preparatory work carried out by the provisional leadership made it possible, under the most difficult conditions, to hold the Fourth Congress of the CPY in the vicinity of Dresden in early November 1928. The Congress aimed the party to overcome factionalism, to improve the forms of work in trade unions, cultural, educational and sports organizations.

At the congress the political secretary of the party was elected Malisic, the organizational secretary was Djuro Djakovic. Gorkich, who made the report "The Sixth Congress of the Communist International" at the congress, first joined the Central Committee of the Party, combining party work with the leadership of YCI (Young Communist International) as its secretary.

By the end of the 1920s, Yugoslavia experienced another political crisis. June 20, 1928 Montenegrin deputy of the Assembly shot the leader of the Croatian peasant party Stepan Radic. This event caused an explosion of indignation in Croatia, in many cities of which protests were held. Croatian Communists called on the masses to take up arms. In Zagreb for several days there were real barricade battles. In the conditions of an acute political crisis, the ruling regime decided to resort to an extreme measure - the establishment of a reactionary dictatorship. On January 6, 1929, the extremely right-wing organization White Hand, supported by King Alexander, committed a coup d'état: dissolved the assembly, suspended the constitution, and banned all political parties. An open monarcho-fascist dictatorship was established.

The difficulties in the illegal work of the party have increased even more. Positive shifts in the organizational construction of the party were prevented by the murder of Juro Djakovic, who was arrested in April 1929 and was soon shot "in an attempt to escape." According to Gorkovich: "the central figure (the new leadership), the axis was Decovic (so in the document – V.Ch). After his assassination, a crisis of leadership began. And here I consider the Comintern's fault that this crisis has dragged on so long " [5]. Since 1930 the leadership of the CPY has been in Vienna, its connections with party organizations in the country were extremely limited. The alarming state of the party forced the Comintern to take an extreme measure: at the end of 1931 to replace the central leadership of the CPY, and in April 1932 to return Philip Filipovich, former head of the provisional leadership of the CPY, to Moscow. On April 3, 1932, at a meeting of the political commission of the political secretariat of the Executive Committee of Communist International (ECCI), it was decided to approve the interim committee, which was entrusted with preparing a conference to elect the leadership of the Communist Party.

This temporary organizing committee included Milan Gorkic, Blagoje Parovic and Vladimir Chopich. Management faced enormous difficulties in fulfilling the task. "It began to work in very difficult conditions, when a large number of cadres in the country (in Yugoslavia) were failed, and in the emigration the " purge "- the check of the cadres began - according to the decision of the Comintern. The Commission of Inquiry of the ECCI interrogated all the suspects for any fault, which caused discontent and disappointment in the work of the new party leadership. In Yugoslavia, there was no trust in this leadership because of the weak conspiracy in the work of the previous leadership, political and organizational mistakes, insufficient assistance and weak leadership of the work of party organizations, and also because of the legacy of factional and group struggle, strong trends in liquidationism, etc. " [6]

They did not help to correct the previous mistakes and friction between members of the interim committee, primarily between Gorkych and Chopich. In these circumstances, in Moscow, on the instructions of the ECCI, a commission was formed to familiarize with the party activity in emigration and with the materials and decisions of the provisional leadership. The commission included former active members of the "leftist" Camilo Horvathin, Stepan Tsviych and Vojislav Vujovic.

In the materials of the commission, based on the results of her work, it was alleged that the interim leadership kept unity, covering up Gorkich's mistakes in the past, which was reflected in the analysis of the

causes of the collapse of the party organizations in 1929-1931. It was also unsubstantiated that Gorkich was a "Bukharinite", a "rightist", a "conciliator". Such conclusions of the commission were repulsed by the members of the provisional leadership. At the suggestion of Chopich in September 1933, the provisional leadership of the CPY sent a letter to the members of the commission. While agreeing with some critical remarks about Gorkich and other members of the provisional leadership, the letter firmly states that such assessments "will not be a healthy foundation for the consolidation of the party" [7].

Particular mention should be made of this aspect of the activities of the provisional leadership of the CPY, such as the desire to involve all party members in the friendly work, regardless of their participation in the past in groups and factions willing to conduct the Comintern and the party as its section. This position was not always understood by the workers of the Comintern. The extremely tense relations that existed at that time between individual members of the Comintern, who supervised the Communist Party, and the provisional leadership, are evidenced by Gorkich's letter to the representative of the CPY in the Comintern to Gregor Vujovic on January 24, 1933. Noting in his letter that the difficulties and shortcomings in the party not the least concern the activities of the relevant bodies of the Comintern, Gorkich said: "We will not allow the leadership of our party to treat it so haughtily and so disparagingly as it has been so far. If there are mistakes, criticize, but it is necessary to renounce that unhealthy generalization about the work of our party, which, due to errors there above (meaning the Comintern-V.Ch.), has become ordinary " [8].

Already then, the provisional leadership, with a certain degree of mistrust, took the results of the "purge" and tried to protect people from condemning the people who were loyal to the party. This is known from the minutes of the meetings of the interim leadership, Gorkich's letters to Gregor Vujovic. Typical examples of this kind are the defense against the charges of Juro Tsviich, Raika Jovanovic.

Nevertheless, the central place in the work of the central leadership at that time was occupied by the preparation of a national conference. Members of the provisional leadership work out draft decisions, send letters to local organizations on regional conferences and election of delegates, travel to the country for meetings with representatives of party organizations and specific assistance to them. In particular, Gorkich visited Yugoslavia in November and early December 1934.

The 4th Conference of the CPY was held on December 24-25, 1934 in Ljubljana. From the party leadership in the work of the conference participated Blagoje Parovic, Carlo Khudomal and Camilo Horvathin. Gorkić did not participate in its work because of the Comintern's ban on going to the country. The delegates subjected the party to a comprehensive review of the party's activities since the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party in 1928, revealing serious shortcomings in the work of the leadership. After discussion, the delegates elected the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party included: Milan Gorkich - political secretary, Blagoje Parovic, Josip Broz Tito (only recently released from prison), Camilo Horvathin and Adolf Muk.

The work of the conference was held during the period of revival of political life in the country. In October 1934, King Alexander was murdered in Marseilles, and his eleventh-year-old son, crowned as Peter the 2nd, took over the royal throne. The power was exercised by the regency council headed by Prince Paul. The regime decided to follow the path of carrying out measures that corresponded to the interests of the bourgeois opposition.

1935 was marked by an increase in the activity of local party organizations, significantly weakened during the punitive measures of power after the coup on January 6, 1929. The Communists made strikes and demonstrations in Zagreb, Belgrade, Ljubljana, Montenegro. May 15, 1935 in Yugoslavia were elections to the Assembly (Parliament). With the help of police control, the authorities managed to achieve full domination of their candidates in the Assembly. The leader of the party Yugoslav Radical Union, which won the election, Milan Stoyadinovich formed the government.

The Communist Party took part in the elections, setting the task of familiarizing the workers and peasants with its political program, seeking to unite the opposition movements in the country (peasant, national liberation, anti-regime, proletarian) into a single popular front. The failure of the party in the elections

revealed significant shortcomings in the tactics of the party, which was the subject of consideration at the Split plenum of the Central Committee of the CPY on June 9-10, 1935.

The delegation of the Communist Party took part in the work of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, held in late July - early August 1935 in Moscow. Gorkich as a representative of the Communist Party became a member of the Presidium of Congress. August 8, 1935 Gorkich made a speech in the debate on the report of Georgi Dimitrov "The onset of fascism and the tasks of the Communist International in the struggle for the unity of the working class against fascism." Having endorsed the report of Dimitrov on behalf of the Yugoslav organization, Gorkich shared his views on the situation in Yugoslavia, pointing out the difficulties and shortcomings in the work of the party; especially pointed out the focus on the creation of an anti-fascist people's front.

"We must learn from our mistakes," Gorkich said. - In 1929, the erroneous slogan of an armed uprising was an expression of our inability to bring the masses to revolutionary positions through a series of partial battles. The inability to establish broad ties with the working masses in the difficult conditions of the underground led to the refusal of the Communists in 1929-1931 to work in reformist trade unions and other mass organizations. This involves the underestimation of the possibility of legal and semi-legal work, which still prevents the party from firmly linking with the broad sections of the working class and the working masses. All these manifestations of sectarianism are the greatest obstacle, making it difficult and still hampering the accomplishment of the tasks facing the party " [9].

The Communist Party leadership placed great hopes on the creation of the Yugoslav Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on the basis of the decision of the 4th Conference (the so-called internal bureau, Zembil). However, the activity of the bureau was uncovered by the Yugoslav police. The failure had grave consequences for the whole party. The insensitive behavior of certain responsible persons, first of all George Mitrovich, allowed the authorities during the investigation to arrest a large number of party members, to obtain valuable information about the activities of the party. As a result, the work of the party organizations in Yugoslavia was again severely undermined, and in a number of places practically ceased.

The consequences of the failure caused the need to change the venue of the Central Committee. Failures aggravated the relationship between the members of the leadership, discontent was drawn to the personality of Gorkich, responsible for organizational work. In this disturbing atmosphere in Vienna on April 9-10, 1936, the regular plenum of the Central Committee of the CPY was held. At the plenum there was an acute criticism of all the Party's leading workers both from individual members of the Central Committee and from the instructors of the Central Committee. The point of criticism was directed primarily at Gorkich as the general secretary of the Central Committee. Gorkich was forced to self-critically evaluate his work, including admitting mistakes in personnel policy, in conspiracy.

The Plenum, on the proposal of Gorkich, made another change in the composition of the Politburo of the Central Committee. Now it includes Josip Broz Tito, Vladimir Chopich, Carlo Kholomal, Adolf Muk, Prezhikov Vorants, Milan Gorkich. Candidates for membership, the Politburo became Stepan Tsviyich, Ivan Marich.

Shortly after the April plenary meeting, the Central Committee of the CPY was subjected to a new test. The leadership of the Comintern summoned the members of the Central Committee to Moscow for a meeting in connection with the decisions of the April plenum. In addition to concerns about the failures in late 1935 and early 1936, the dissatisfaction of the Comintern was caused by the fact that the plenum passed without agreement with it. After consultation of the staff of the Comintern with the Yugoslav communists in Moscow, then with the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the meeting in August 1936 began to work.

Here is how the meeting is described in one of documents: [10]

"The meeting considered the full activities of the CPY and its leadership, and especially analyzed the materials and conclusions of the April plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The meeting was attended by Josip Broz Tito, Blagoi Parovic and Ivan Grzetich, members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party elected at the 4th Conference of the Communist Party of 1934, party activists who worked in Moscow: Philip Filipovich, Radomir and Gregor Vujovici, Bozhedar Maslarich, Simo Milyush, Dragutin Gustenchich, Ivan Regent, doctor Obrad Kusovats, Vilim Horwai, and Georgy Dimitrov played an important role on the part of the Comintern, in addition to his other representatives.

The meeting subjected to sharp criticism a number of provisions of the leadership of the CPY, presented in the conclusions of the plenum. Among them: the political line, the relations within the CC CPY, the evaluation of foreign policy relations of Yugoslavia and other countries (neglect of the danger of Hitler's expansion, and the involvement of Yugoslavia in the orbit of fascist countries), a retreat from the line of the VII Congress of the Comintern. It also points to erroneous assessments of the policy of the CPY in the national question, to shortcomings in the implementation of personnel policy, as well as in organizational matters.

Milan Gorkich, as one of the most influential members of the party leadership, was seriously criticized for not having stopped the April plenum and not informing on time the Comintern about its conduct and documents prepared for the plenum, that is, did not ask for help and interference. In particular, he was accused of poor personnel policy and neglect of organizational work. The meeting rejected the decisions of the Central Committee of the CPY and approved after many days of discussions the new directions of the work of the CPY and its leadership that corresponded to the line of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, aimed the party in all areas of political work in order to liquidate the remnants of factionalism and create a party apparatus out of proven personnel.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPY on the tactics and work of the Party was placed in the basis of the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party declared in Proletary "Against the military danger, against the onset of fascist reaction. We will unite all democratic forces in a united front in Yugoslavia. "

At this time, the party suffered new losses due to failures in Zagreb, Ljubljana, Belgrade, Vojvodina. Here it should be said that the work of members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav staff of the Comintern was complicated by the atmosphere of suspicion and denunciations associated with the "cleansing" of the "enemies of the people" that unfolded in the USSR after the murder of S.M. Kirov. In March 1936, the Soviet leadership decided to purge political emigrants, and this campaign gained momentum. All political emigrants in the country had to take part in the struggle against Trotskyism and prove their reliability. Nevertheless, many of them could not do this. Particularly tragic consequences were the adoption by the ECCI of a resolution on the struggle against Trotskyism on May 29, 1937.

It contained the demand: "to purge organizations of double-armed Trotskyite elements, sent by the class enemy in order to disorganize the Communist Party; to remove from the responsible positions of the former Trotskyists who have not proved by their work for several years the sincerity of their departure from

Trotskyism and the real loyalty of the party and the cause of the working class " [11]. There are reports that during the "purge" period in the USSR, more than 800 Yugoslav emigrants were arrested.

Unfortunately, there were few documents showing the work of the General Secretary of the Central CPY Gorkich, who stayed in Moscow, for three months after the meeting. October 16, 1936 after a long stay in Moscow October 16, 1936, after a long stay in Moscow, Tito went abroad with a Yugoslav passport issued in the name of Ivan Kisich. In his memoirs, Tito states that in Moscow he received from the Comintern then the task of arriving in Yugoslavia for organizing party work.

Arriving in Vienna, Tito met with members of the Central Committee and waited for further instructions. December 8, 1936 from Moscow through Prague in Vienna arrived Gorkich. At a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee, a decision was taken to move the Central Committee to Paris. Gorkich brought to the attention of the members of the Central Committee that he had received from the Comintern the

authority to lead a new leadership consisting of Tito, Ciolakovic, Jujovic, Leskoshik and Gorkich. Tito was instructed to go to Yugoslavia to organize the dispatch of Yugoslav volunteers to participate in the civil war in Spain.

True to international duty, the leaders of the Central Committee, including Milan Gorkich and Adolphe Muk, were organizing the point for receiving and sending volunteers. For this purpose, for 700,000 francs, from the Comintern, there was a leased French ship "Corsica", which was to transport more than 500 people to Spain. The operation, which took place in March 1937, ended in complete failure. The police detained the ship along with the volunteers. Muk, who supervised the operation, was arrested. Being under investigation, Muk gave testimony that revealed the work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the police. This caused another blow to activity in the country and abroad.

Nevertheless, it is estimated that up to 1,500 Yugoslav volunteers took part in the Spanish Civil War on the side of the Spanish Republic, of which about half did not return from the war. In the battle of Madrid on July 6, 1937, a member of the CPY, Blagoje Parovic, representative of the Central Committee in Spain, who was a political instructor of the 13th interbrigade, was fatally wounded.

And three days before the last meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party with the participation of its general secretary, Milan Gorkich, took place. He had already received the summons of the Comintern to Moscow for the report and agreed that during his absence, Radomljub Czolakovich would carry out the connection of Bogomil Schmelser with the representative of the Comintern in Paris. Upon his arrival in Moscow, Gorkich was arrested on August 14, 1937, charged with Trotskyite-terrorist activities and espionage, and was shot on November 1, 1937, on the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR (according to other sources he died in prison on October 4, 1939 [12]). In 1956, Gorkich was posthumously rehabilitated not only on the judicial line due to lack of guilt, but also on the party line.

The remaining members of the Central Committee of the CPY, after Gorkich departure, for several months were unaware of his fate. Tito was at that time in Yugoslavia, establishing links with the few remaining cadres. By the end of 1937 the party numbered about 1500 people. From August 1937, Tito actually supervised the work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which was in Paris. Encountering the opposition of several members of the Central Committee, Tito, returning in June 1938 to Moscow on the call of the ECCI, achieved a decision on the liquidation of the foreign leadership of the Communist Party.

On September 23, 1938, Tito handed over a statement titled "My relationship with persons who are exposed as harm-makers and enemies of our party" [13]. This statement gives negative feedback on a number of former leaders of the Communist Party, including Gorkich. During the period of the campaign against the "enemies of the people" that unfolded in 1937-1938, the following prominent figures of the

Communist Party were arrested, accused of sabotage and terrorism, and sentenced to be shot. They were rehabilitated after the XX Congress of the CPSU:

Vladimir Chopich, Senko Georg Winter, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party;  
Kerberi Karl Yakovlevich, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, a representative of the CPY at the ECCI;  
Markovich Sima Milosevic, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, member of the ECCI;  
Likht Franz Dmitrievich, who is also Vujovic Radomir, a member of the Central Committee of the CPY, referent to the ECCI;  
Martynovich Ivan Pavlovich, who is also Dobrovolsky, Muksic, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was at the disposal of the ECCI;  
Tsvich Stepan Georgievich, candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, secretary of the Communist Youth of Yugoslavia (died while under investigation);  
Krešić Georgi, who was also Georgy Georgievich Zveich, was in the leading position in the Communist Party;

Fleischer Leo Alexandrovich, who is also Grshetich Ivan, a representative of the Communist Party at the ECCI;  
Petrovsky Boris Nikolaevich, he is also Croatian Kamilo, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party;

Vujovic Vojislav (Voya), member of the Presidium of the ECCI, secretary of the executive committee of CYI (arrested, killed in prison);  
Vujovic Gregor, representative of the Communist Party in the Comintern.

And although organizational weaknesses, tactical mistakes, repression of leading cadres undoubtedly weakened the party, in the hardest conditions of the underground, a generation of fighters has been forged through, unbending communist revolutionaries such as Momchilo Milutinovich Djuric, the legendary Yugoslavian partisan, Zrenjanin Zharko "Ucha", a member of the CPY Central Committee, the national hero of Yugoslavia.

The courageous struggle of the best sons and daughters of Yugoslavia, their selfless devotion to the cause of communism and the first country of socialism of the USSR is inspired in the book "Comrades of Mine" by Predrag Chadomirovich Milichevich.

Tito himself at this time was tested for reliability. In particular, he had to give explanations in connection with the arrest of his wife Bauer Lucia by the organs of the NKVD. The survived non-stenographic record of the conversation between Comrade Dimitrov and Comrade Walter (Tito-V.Ch.) dated December 30, 1938, indicates how serious the doubts were with the leadership of the Comintern regarding Tito's ability to eliminate the crisis of the leadership of the CPY. Here are excerpts from it: "His (Walter's) work plan at the time of his departure from USSR is the following - to put things in order in Paris, where there were people of the former leadership of the party and Spanish volunteers evacuated from Spain ...

Utterances and instructions of Comrade Dimitrov:

1. At the top of the Communist Party, all are factionalists, and you are also factionalist.
2. You are not doing your job well, it is rotten. So, as you imagine it, does not work.
3. The ECCI Resolution - the directive for work, must be discussed and published in the country - in the "Proletarian" in the form of an open letter to the members of the party.
4. Everything that we have now outlined will be temporary until the situation in the country is clarified. Now we can not approve the leadership of the party, we need more data for this.

The governing group is still to be retained in the composition of the group: Djilas, Leka, Birk, Poldi, Leskoshek, Crash and Walter (Leka-Rankovich, Krash Ivan, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was killed during the national liberation war, Poldi - Marinko Micha, member of the Central Committee of the CPY, Birk - Kardel, Walter - Tito).

It was stated to Walter directly and openly that ECCI does not have full confidence in him and that in order to gain the confidence of the ECCI, he needs to show by deeds that he performs in good faith the instructions of the ECCI. It was also stated to him: "You are not the head of the CPY, but a binding delegate who connects us with the Yugoslav proletariat and Yugoslav figures ... The ECCI will approve the leadership of the CPY only after a meeting in the country" [14].

Already after the ECCI's decision to send Tito to Yugoslavia, the Secretary of the ECCI, Dmitri Manuilsky, on January 7, 1939, sent Dimitrov the proposal: "To remove Walter from his job in responsible positions in Yugoslavia as bearing his share of responsibility for the failure of the expedition" [15]. The proposal was not supported. In December 1938, under the leadership of Tito, the "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party" was developed. It was approved by the ECCI and served as a basis for the further actions of Tito and his like-minded people. The resolution stated that the party did not use huge opportunities in their work, largely related to the activities of the enemies of the working class who had penetrated into its leading bodies. The resolution called for an end to the conciliatory behavior of individual Communists regarding Trotskyites and all anti-Party phenomena. The resolution referred to the need for a

regular edition of the Central Party organ "Proleter", as well publishing in Yugoslavia the short course of "The History of the AUCP (b)", and organization of its study by all Communists and UCY members.

Having received an interim mandate from the ECCI to conduct organizational work on the convocation of the congress, Tito left Moscow for Yugoslavia in late January 1939. On March 15 - 18, 1939, a meeting of the selected provisional leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was held on Lake Bohinj in Slovenia. It consisted of: Milovan Djilas, Yva Lola Ribar, Edward Kardel, Alexander Rankovic, Zagreb worker Josip Krash, Franz Leskoček, Mihai Marinko, Joseph Broz Tito. The main task of this meeting was to "cleanse" the party leadership from those who prevented its strengthening, from the Trotskyites and other anti-Party elements. In an open letter to the members of CPY it was reported that Gorkich, Marich, Kusovats, Petko Miletic, Sima Markovich, Chopich and other former leaders of the CPY had been expelled from the party, 30 altogether, most of whom had by that time been arrested by the NKVD. For many years their names were forgotten not only in the USSR, but also in Yugoslavia. The decisions of the Slovenian Conference were approved by the Comintern. From now on, the seat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party became Zagreb. Local party organizations were given the directive to hold party conferences on the ground and elect delegates to the 5th Yugoslav conference. Such conferences were held from May to early September 1940. About 1500 delegates took part in them. Conducted conferences demonstrated the growth of the party's influence among the masses, increasing its cohesion.

At the 5th Conference of the CPY held in the suburbs of Zagreb from 19 to 23 September 1940, in which 105 delegates took part, a complete reorganization of the leadership of the CPY took place. The elected Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia included 22 members and 16 candidates. In addition to Tito, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee included: Kardel, Leskoshek, Milutinovic, Rankovich, Konchar and Djilas. Tito became the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. By that time the number of the party reached 6455 people. The growth of party ranks continued after the end of the conference, so that by the beginning of the national liberation war the Communist Party had already about 12,000 members. Another 30,000 members were in the UCM.

The party not only survived the hard trials, but also became one of the strong sections of the Comintern, which was shown by the people's liberation war of the Yugoslav people, which began after the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR. And quite rightly in Edward Kardel's report at an information conference of representatives of some communist parties in Poland at the end of September 1947 it was said: "It is profoundly mistaken that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia only during the war entered into contact with the broad masses or only" accidentally, "thanks to some "favorable" circumstances during the war gained

influence over the masses. On the contrary, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, long before the war, won strong positions among the masses of the people " [16].

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